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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

E. A. RUSSELL and MARTELL E. RUSSELL,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Supreme Court
No. 14124

PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION, et. al.,
Defendants-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment that a lease
between the parties was terminated, and for certain liquidated
damages and upon Defendant-Appellants counterclaim for relief
from the termination and to establish that a certain option
contained in the lease agreement was still in force even if the
lease were terminated•
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following reversal of a summary judgment for Plaintiff by
this Court in Russell vs. Park City Utah Corporation, 29 Utah
2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973), a trial on the merits was held and
judgment was entered for Plaintiffs-Respondents on their complaint
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except for the $2,500.00 damages and Defendant's counterclaim was
dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek affirmance of the order entered
below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since reference will be made to the Record, the Trial Transcript (which has not been incorporated in the Record by numbering
the pages), Exhibits introduced at trial, and the deposition of
Robert W. Major, introduced at the trial, reference to the Record
will be by the designation "R", to the Trial Transcript by "Tr",
to the Exhibits as "Ex" and

to the deposition by "D" with the

appropriate page number or Exhibit number given*

Plaintiffs-

Respondents will be referred to as "Plaintiffs" and DefendantAppellant as "Defendant",

Two Defendants served and named in the

case caption below, Major-Blakeney Corporation and Robert W. Major,
will be referred to by name.
Plaintiff entered into a "Lease and Purchase Agreement" with
Major-Blakeney Corporation, Defendant's predecessor, which agreement is dated March 31, 1967.

(Ex. 11). Thereafter, on or about

August 7, 1968, Major-Blakeney Corporation assigned "all of its
right, title and interest in and to" said lease to Defendant, by
which assignment Defendant agreed "to faithfully perform" the »
obligations imposed under the agreement.

(Ex. 12). The lease
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between Plaintiffs and Major-Blakeney Corporation was prepared by
attorney William Richards who was acting as the attorney for the
lessee, Major-Blakeney Corporation.

(Tr. 40, 130; D. 10, 11).

Although the lease year ran from March 31, of each year to March
31, of the succeeding year (commencing with the year 1967), the
rental payments of $2.50 per acre for approximately 2,000 acres
was payable on or before the 1st day of November of each year
commencing with the year 1967 so that the annual rental payment
did not become due until over half of the rental year had expired.
The rental due and payable on November 1, 1967, was paid on said
date.

For the next lease period—March 31, 1968, to March 31,

1969—the rent was paid by a check mailed with a letter dated
December 5, 1968.

(D. 26, 27; Ex. 2). For the following year the

lease payment was made on or about December 15, 1969.

(D. 29;

Ex. 3). Thereafter, when the rent came due on November 1, 1970,
(for the period March 31, 1970, to March 31, 1971), no payment
was made (Tr. 43-45; D. 31) f even though payment was received by
Defendant from the sublessee in the amount of $7,768.28.

(D. 34,

35; Ex. 4).
Robert W. Major, who at all times was Defendant's agent
(D. 36), testified that prior to the end of the calendar year of
1970, he was aware that Defendant had not paid Plaintiffs (D. 41)
and that after discussing it with the accountant for the Defendant
corporation it was decided that Defendant would seek to have the
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sublessee pay the rental rather than Defendant paying it.

(D. 39-

41).. Subsequently, under date of March 3, 1971, the law firm of
Richards and Richards wrote a letter to Plaintiff E. A. Russell
stating that "the sublessee through its president, Mr. Robert W.
Ensign, is being requested to pay you directly in this instance,
for which my client will credit their account to that extent".
(D. 47-49; Ex. 6). Thereafter, under date of March 9, 1971, a
letter was sent to Mr. Major stating that the sublessee "does not
accept your attempted unilateral assignment to the Russells of any
override which may be owing in the future.

This 'convenient1

way of attempting to avoid your resposibility to the Russells
should not impress them any more than it does" the sublessee.
A copy of this letter was also sent to Defendant's attorney.
(D. 50; Ex. 7).
Thereafter, on March 12, 1971, a notice was sent by the lessor
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph VIII of the lease, directed
to Defendant Park City Utah Corporation in c/o William S. Richards,
its attorney, advising Defendant of the default in the payment of
rent and specifying that unless su^h default is corrected "on or
before 45 days from receipt of this notice, lessor shall consider
this lease terminated and cancelled".
Defendant on March 12, 1971.

This notice was received by

(Ex. 8). The notice of default was

sent to Defendant in c/o Richards and Richards, attorneys for said
corporation, at 1610 Walker Bank Building pursuant to the assignmei
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from Major-Blakeney Corporation to Defendant and further pursuant
to the notice given by Defendant to Plaintiffs under date of
December 5, 1968.

(Ex. 2, 12). The notice which was sent certi-

fied mail was receipted for Park City Utah Corporation by Lala
Gallegos at the address indicated on March 12, 1971.

(Tr. 36-37,

130-31; Ex. 8).
The notice was followed up by a subsequent letter dated March
29, 1971, sent to Robert W. Major, Jr., with a copy to William S.
Richards, attorney, in which it was stated that the default "must
be corrected on or before April 26, 1971, in accordance with the
terms of the Russell lease".

(Ex. 9).

No attempt was made to correct the default in the lease until
June 7, 1971, at which time a letter was sent to Plaintiffs'
attorney enclosing a check in the amount of $4,855.18, which
represented the principal amount of the rent due the preceding
November 1, 1970, but without inclusion of any interest.

(Ex. 10).

The only reason given for the failure to pay the lease payment
due November 1, 19 70, was that Defendant was going to seek to
have the sublessee pay it because Defendant felt that the sublessee
owed Defendant various sums of money on account of other transactions
between the parties.

(D. 63-67).

Defendant "Park City Utah Corpo-

ration had the money to pay the rent if it had wanted to pay it"
during the entire period of time.

(D. 67). The attempted tender

of rent on June 7, 1971, was inadequate and insufficient to pay the
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rent, together with interest which had accrued thereon, or to
satisfy the terms and conditions of the lease and purchase agreement.

(Ex. 25).

Because of the Defendant1s failure to pay the annual rental
due and owing November 1, 1970, in the amount of $4,855.20, after
formal notice given as required by the terms of said lease, said
lease agreement was terminated, forfeited and cancelled; and on
June 24, 1971, Plaintiffs filed an action in the District Court of
Summit County, State of Utah, requesting the Court to adjudge and
determine that said lease and purchase agreement "has been and now
is terminated and cancelled" and further requesting the Court to
award Plaintiffs the sum of $2,500.00 damages as provided by
paragraph VIII of the said agreement".

(R. 1, 2).

Defendants Major-Blakeney Corporation and Robert W. Major
respectively filed separate motions to quash service of summons
and to dismiss.

(R. 49, 50). Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a

motion to dismiss without prejudice as to those Defendants (R.169)
which was granted.

(R.182).

Park City Utah Corporation appeared and defended, counterclaiming that the tender of June 7, 1971, had kept the lease in
force.

After the reversal of the summary judgment, trial was set

for December 11, 1974.

(R. 200). Don R. Strong, who appeared

for Defendant in April, 1974, moved at the trial for a continuance
and to add additional parties, which motions were denied, and to
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file an amended counterclaim, which had been in the file since
February, 1972, as a proposed amended counterclaim.

(R. 82-86).

The latter motion was agreed to by Plaintiffs with the stipulation
that there be no continuance and that Plaintiffs be deemed to
have denied the amended counterclaim generally.

(Tr. 17-20).

No showing was made by Defendant that it could not have made its
motion for continuance or its motion to add parties prior to the
day of trial, although Strong remarked that he hadn't obtained
the file when he appeared and never did obtain it.

(Tr. 23-24).

With respect to the motion to add parties, the Court inquired of
counsel for possible grounds (Tr. 26). The trial proceeded.

The

Court filed a memorandum decision thereafter, finding for Plaintiffs
as to termination of the lease, denying liquidated damages, and
dismissing Defendant's Amended Counterclaim.
•

*

.

This appeal followed.

• . ' •

THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT (EXHIBIT 8) SERVED ON DEFENDANT BY
PLAINTIFFS WAS SUFFICIENT TO COMMENCE THE RUNNING OF THE GRACE
PERIOD.
A notice of termination of lease'for non-payment of rent
should conform to the requirements of the lease.
ALR 2d 321, 387 (1953).

Annot. 31

A notice consistent with the contractual

specifications for notice is sufficient to commence the running of
a grace period specified by the lease.

Swigert vs. Stafford,

85 Cal. App. 2d 469, 193 P.2d 106 (1948); 58 AM. JUR. 2d, Notice,
§24; C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, §89.5 at n.52-53.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The contract specifies the form of notice in paragraph VIII
on page 5 of Exhibit 11 as follows:
"No default of Lessee in any of the provisions hereof shall
constitute a basis for forfeiture of this lease unless the
same shall continue for more than forty-five (45) days after
written notice to Lessee specifying of what the default consists, and in the event that Lessee fails to correct said
default within such further time as is reasonably necessary
to cure the same Lessee shall quit and surrender the premises
to Lessors.... (Emphasis supplied)
The contract requires (1) written notice, (2) brought home
to Lessee, (3) of what the default consists.

There are no other

requirements in the contract applicable to the notice. Plaintiffs'
notice, Exhibit 8, satisfies fully and strictly the contractual
requirements.
Kuiken vs. Garrett, 243 Iowa 785, 51 N.W.2d 149, 41 A.L.R.2d
1397 (1952) cited by Defendant as 41 A.L.R.2d 1400 n.25 requires
that the grace period commence at the time of receipt of the
notice; the notice in that case was defective in that it specified
the date of mailing as the commencement of the period.

Plaintiffs

verified the receipt of notice and later advised Defendant of the
actual date upon which the grace period was to end.

(Ex. 9).

Defendant had a reasonable time more than forty-five days
after default to cure their default before suit was filed.

Notice

as required by contract was served upon Defendant upon March 12,
1971.

The 45 day period specified by the notice dia not terminate

until April 26, and this suit was filed June 25, 1971, a full 60
days later.

According to Robert Major, Defendant had the money

-8-
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to pay the rent during this period (D.67).
Where a contract requires the mere payment of money, a
reasonable time for payment is short.

The court approved a

twenty-three day period to bring a real estate contract current
as a matter of law in

Pacific Development Company v. Stewart,

113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948).

What is a reasonable time

is determined by the subject, the situation of the parties and
the circumstances attending the performance.

Clevenger v.

Potlatch Forests, Inc.# 85 Idaho 193, 377 P.2d 794 (1963).
Where the subject is the payment of money pursuant to contract,
promptitude should be required.

Reasonable time to pay for

property delivered under s contract of sale means such promptitude as the circumstances of the case will allow and does not
mean indulgence in unnecessary delay or in a delay occasioned
by a vain hope and a fruitless effort to obtain the money from
a defaulting buyer.

Cincinnati Ry. Supply Co. v. Hartlieb, 214

F.2d 177, 178 (6th Cir. 1914); cf. Utah Code Ann. 70A-2-310(a).
Delay occasioned by efforts to raise funds from third parties
do

not/ therefore, provide justification for an extended

"reasonable time"

under paragraph VIII of the lease (Ex. 8).

A reasonable time is the time a person of ordinary diligence
and prudence would use under similar circumstances.

Glen Cove

Marina, Inc., v. Vessel Little Jennie, 269 F. Supp. 877, 879
(E. D. N* Y. 1967).

Time required to build a road or cut

a stand of timber would be longer than time needed to write and
deliver a check in making a payment of money, particularly if
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the payor is a man of prudence and diligence and it is admitted
that payor has the funds to make the payment and has had them
for six months.

(D. 67-70, Ex. 4).

Plaintiffs' notice under paragraph VIII of the contract
stated that Plaintiffs would consider the lease terminated if
default went beyond 45 days.

Despite this provision, Plaintiffs

waited several more weeks before terminating the lease, thus
allowing Defendant more than a reasonable time to cure its default.
In view of the relationship of Defendant with the attorney who
drafted the lease, who represented Defendant throughout the
period relevant hereto and who was certainly in a position to
advise Defendant with respect to its duties under the contract, >
Defendant is in no position to claim prejudice because Plaintiffs
insisted on the 45 day provision in the notice.

Cf. Andreason vs.

Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959); cf. Drey vs. Doyle,
99 Mo. 459, 12 S.W. 287 (1889).

(Defendants waived the defect, if

any, in the notice by their attempted tender of June 7, 1971).
•

I I

•

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT RELIEF FROM THE
TERMINATION OF THE LEASE.
Relief from forfeiture of a lease is an equitable remedy.
"All arrears of rent, interest, and costs must be paid or tendered"
Sheets vs.

Selden, 7 Wall (74 U. S.) 416, 421 (1869).

tioner for such relief must show good faith.

The peti-

In Sheets, the Court

denied relief because—
"The spirit manifested by the appellant throughout the
litigation, as disclosed by the bill, is not persuasive
to such
a tribunal [Court of equity] to lend him its aid".
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Defendant has satisfied neither of these criteria.

The

June 7, 1971, tender by Defendant was insufficient in failing to
provide interest (74 Am. Jur. 2d Tender §22,23), and no good faith
was shown by Defendant, which claims it had the money to pay all
along, even though this story changed at trial.

The second tender,

after the summary judgment, is not in issue here, not having been
raised at trial by pleading or even by argument.

But even if it

were properly before the Court, it would be insufficient for failure
to include all arrears of rent, for by then a second lease year
had passed.
The trial Court found that the tender of June 7, 1971, was
insufficient and that Defendant had no justifiable excuse for
failure to pay the rent during the 45 day grace period (R. 219).
With respect to those findings, the principle announced in Pagano
vs. Walker, 539 P.2d 452 (Utah, 1975) should apply:
"In determining whether the evidence meets this standard,
in equity cases such as this is, this court may review the
facts. However, it has long been established and reiterated
by this court in numerous cases that due to the advantaged
position of the trial court we will review its findings and
judgments with considerable indulgence, and will not disagree
with and upset them unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against them, or the court has mistaken or misapplied the
law applicable thereto". (footnotes omitted)
539 P.2d at 454
In the case of Groendycke vs. Ellis, 205 Kan. 545, 470 P.2d
832, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that although the court may
grant relief from a forfeiture for non payment of rent, it will
not do so where the failure to pay is wilful, calculated or
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persistent or under circumstances negating exercise of good faith.
If ever there was a case of wilful, calculated and persistent
refusal to conform to the conditions of the lease, it is this one.
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DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE "REDEMPTION AND RESTORATION
PROVISIONS" OF SECTION 78-36-10, UCA, 1953, AS AMENDED.

,

A casual glance at Section 78-36-10, UCA, 1953, as amended,
demonstrates that this statute has no application here.

First of

all, it reads "when the proceeding is for an unlawful detainer".

I

Obviously this is not an action for unlawful detainer.

|

Further, the statute does not apply even in unlawful detainer
actions unless the lease "has not by its terms expired".

By the

terms of this lease, it has terminated by forfeiture where the
rent has not been paid as required.
In Baker vs. Lehrer, 210 Or. 635, 312 P.2d 1072, the court
held that where the rent was tendered by a tenant 26 days after the
time reserved in the lease and 16 days after the statutory grace
period for paying the rent, there was a forfeiture for non payment
of the rent even though payment was tendered before forfeiture
was actually declared by the landlord.
We also point out that at the time judgment was rendered in
this case (March 17, 1972) another rental year had gone by; and if
the action were one to enforce payment of rent, the judgment would
have included not only the obligation to pay the rent for the
year 1970-71, but also the rental year 1971-72, which amount would

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have approximated $10,000.00, including interest and costs. At
no time did Defendant tender into court the amount which would
have accrued under the lease to the date of judgment.

In this

connection, the decision of this Court in Commercial Block Realty
Company vs. Merchant's Protective Association, 71 Utah 505,
267 Pac. 1009, is pertinent.

There the court held that if the

tender of rent is insufficient in amount, it constitutes no
tender at all,
IV
PLAINTIFFS' RELETTING THE LEASED PROPERTY AFTER TERMINATION
OF THE LEASE DOES NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME HEREIN.
After declaring a forfeiture of the lease in suit, Plaintiffs
relet the property (Ex. 26). Negotiation for the new lease began
after the filing of this suit.
Senter vs. Propst,

(Tr. 82). Defendant cites

197 So. 100 (Miss. 1940) to support its claim

that the reletting was a waiver of Plaintiffs rights.

In Senter,

however, there was no notice given of forfeiture and no demand for
payment of rent.

The subtenant in Senter participated in the decision

to declare a forfeiture.

Furthermore, the owner had failed to

demand the rent for six (6) years either in person or by agent.
And the pleadings in Senter specifically

raised the issue of

fraud. None of these facts are found in the case at bar.
Defendant had ample opportunity at the trial to press its
claim under the Senter case.

Twice counsel for Defendant stated

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in response to questions from the court that Defendant's claim
was not based on fraud.

(Tr. 66, 115).

Even before the notice of forfeiture, the Defendant had
notice that their subtenants, Ski Park City West, intended to
contact Plaintiffs if the rent was not paid, to protect their
interest in the land.

(Ex. 7 ) . Plaintiffs diligently tried to

collect the unpaid rent (Tr. 44) and had not waived timely payment.

(Tr. 42, 67; Ex. 1, 2, 3 ) . See Miller Dairy Products Co.

vs. Puryear,

310 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1958).

Defendant was fully

aware of the role of Arthur H. Nielsen as counsel for Russells and
for Ski Park City West from March 12, 1970, on and
to complain of that.

has no basis

(Ex. 7, 8; Tr. 92).

And the argument that Plaintiffs obtained a more lucrative
lease after forfeiture fails to account for the fact that Plaintiffs
obtained no rental whatever for their property from March 31, 1970,
to June 30, 1971, a period of 1 1/4 years.
The court below found that Defendant failed to prove impropriety in the relationship between Plaintiffs and Ski Park City
West or otherwise establish its claim under the second count of
the amended counterclaim.

(R. 219). Defendant moved for a

continuance and to join other parties at the time of trial,
presumably to develop this portion of its case, which motions
were denied, no showing having been made that said motions could
not have been made prior to trail.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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V
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE IN THE LEASE IS NOT SEVERABLE•
There are two options expressed in the 1967 lease, (Ex. 11)
one of which was exercised and for which full payment has been
received (Tr. 49-50).

The second option, in paragraph VII of

the lease, recites no separate consideration and none was given
for it.
option

(Tr. 41, 51-52).

Termination of a lease terminates an

founded on a consideration not divisible from the lease

consideration.

Annot., Termination of Lease as Termination of

Option to Purchase Therein Contained, 10 A.L.R.2d 884, 887-88
(1950).

See Shoemaker vs. Pioneer Investments,

14 Utah 2d 250,

381 P.2d 735 (1963).
The consideration recited

in paragraph VI of the lease

was to apply on the first option, if exercised-"As a further consideration for the above option, and other
privileges to purchase hereinafter recited, and in addition
to the other covenants and conditions contained in this
Agreement, Lessee agrees and herewith deposits with Lessors
the sum of $1,000.00 cash to apply on the purchase price of
the first property to be acquired by Lessee hereunder. In
the event Lessee does not exercise any of its rights to
purchase land prior to November 16, 1967, it is expressly
understood and agreed between Lessors and Lessee that the
said $1,000.00 shall be applied to the lease payments, as
above set forth, for the period March 31, 1967 through
March 31, 1968".
(Ex.11, page 4) (Emphasis added).
(The official copy of this Exhibit has apparently been altered by
the Defendant, since the xerographic copy bears recording marks
and Plaintiffs1 copy does not show the pencilled-in changes).

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant's citation of Falkenstein vs. Popper,
707 (Cal. App. 1947) is erroneous.

183 P.2d

That case states—

"Moreover, the weight of authority holds that the use of
such words as "first privilege", "first right", etc.,
do not give the lessee an absolute right to purchase or
renew a lease".
183 P.2d at 709
The court below found against Defendant as to severability
and should be sustained.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN DENYING LAST-MINUTE
MOTIONS FOR A CONTINUANCE OR JOINDER.
The court has power, within its discretion to add parties
at any stage of the action.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

21.

That discretion is subject, however, to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1, and 20(b), which provide in pertinent p a r t —
"These rules.... shall be liberally construed to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action". Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1.
"The court may make such orders as will prevent a party from
being embarrassed, delayed or put to expense by the inclusion
of a party against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts
no claim against him...." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 20(b).
The record shows that Mr. Strong had ample time in which to
pursue the matters raised in his motion for joinder and for continuance prior to trail.

Nothing was done form April to late

November, 1974, while he was counsel of record.

Court and counsel

for Plaintiff generously acceded to Mr. Strong's wish to file
his amended counterclaim, although leave to file it had never been
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obtained since the reversal of summary judgment,

Mr. Strong was

not surprised, Bairas vs. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375
(1962), and if he was it was only because of his lack of diligence
which the trial court did not excuse.
Plaintiffs were not obliged by Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7 to
join Defendant's subtenant herein, because this is not an unlawful
detainer action.

And Plaintiff sought no declaratory relief

against Defendant's subtenant.

A subtenant not in default need not

be joined in forfeirture action.

Telegraph Ave. Corp. vs. Raentsch,

269 P. 1109, 1111 (Cal. App. 1928).
Defendant complains that the recorded judgment interferes with
conveyances of land earlier made by Defendants.

A record of

closing and a policy of insurance showing title in the grantees
is in the official file.

(Ex. 13, 14).

(Ex. 13, 14, and 15,

have apparently been altered with red pencil).

Presumably the

warranty deeds running from Plaintiffs to the grantees (Ex. 13,
and 14) will transfer after-acquired title and otherwise protect
the grantees.
judgment.

Furthermore, neither grantee is a party to the

(Ex. 14).
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SUMMARY
The Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the judgment should
be affirmed.
Arthur H. Nielsen
Bruce Findlay
NIELSON, CONDER, HENRIOD & GOTTFREDSON
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents
SERVED the foregoing BRIEF this

day of December, 1975,

by mailing two copies, postage prepaid, to

DON R. STRONG, Esq.
197 South Main Street
Springville, Utah
84663.
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